Abstract. In this paper, we present the cryptanalysis of a public key scheme based on a system of multivariate polynomial equations, the "tractable rational map" cryptosystem. We show combinatorial weaknesses of the cryptosystem, and introduce a variant of the XL resolution algorithm, the Linear Method, which is able to leverage these weaknesses to invert in short time the trapdoor one-way function defined by the cipher using only the public key, and even rebuild a private key. We also interpret the behavior of the Linear Method on random instances of the scheme, and show that various generalizations of the cipher, as well as an increase of the security parameter, cannot lead to a secure scheme.
Introduction
Several recent public key cryptosystems use multivariate polynomial systems of equations instead of number-theoretic constructions. The "public" operation in such a system is to evaluate the system output on a given input value: this is a very simple operation even for devices with limited resources such as smart cards, although the system needs to be stored. The "private" operation is to find a preimage of a given value.
Determining whether a random system of n polynomial equations with n variables over any finite field has a solution is known to be a NP-complete problem, and thus seems to be a good starting point to build a cryptosystem. But the polynomial systems used in cryptographic applications must have a special form to make the solving operation possible given the knowledge of a secret backdoor. Thus the cryptanalyst does not have to solve random polynomial systems, but rather random instances of a special subfamily of polynomial systems.
The first cryptosystems based on polynomial equations were defeated. For example the Matsumoto-Imai scheme introduced in 1988 [6] was cryptanalyzed by J. Patarin (Crypto 95, [14] ). More recently, some attacks against stronger schemes, such as HFE (Eurocrypt 96, [15] ) or SFLASH (RSA Conference 2001, [13] ), have emerged. In addition, a 80-bit HFE challenge was broken by J.-C. Faugere in 2002 [4] . It was later described by Faugère and Joux how to attack HFE using an optimized Gröbner basis algorithm and a linear algebra approach (see [7] ).
All these cryptosystems share some common properties:
-They use only quadratic equations on the ground field. We can however notice that, in general, an equation of degree more than 2 is equivalent to a quadratic system with more variables. -Public and private keys are systems of equations related by a linear or affine masking: a composition with a linear or affine transformation on the left, and a linear or affine substitution of variables on the right is performed on the private key to hide its structure, and the result constitutes the public key.
Finding whether two random systems are equal under such a transformation is a difficult problem (it is referred to as the "Isomorphisms of Polynomials" (IP) problem, and is studied in [12] ), thus the linear/affine masking seems a strong enough barrier between the public and the private key.
These cryptosystems also generally use the relation between n-variable polynomials over a field F , and univariate polynomials over an extension G of degree n of F : any system composed of n equations in n variables over F can be transformed into a unique 1-variable polynomial over G. For example, the HFE private key is a sparse polynomial over an extension of GF (2 7 ); the function it defines can be inverted using the Berlekamp algorithm. But the system can also be expressed using several polynomials over the ground field GF (2 7 ).
The Tractable Rational Map Cryptosystem (TRMC, [2] ) also follows this framework: its private key comprises equations on various extensions of GF (2 8 ). It is in a block triangular form: a subset of the equations can be solved, and then the result injected into other equations to further solve the system. We will show that this structure is not well hidden by a linear masking. In fact, an attacker can solve the public system using essentially the same resolution technique as the owner of the private key (of course, the resolution time will be higher, albeit still feasible in a reasonable time).
The outline of this paper is as follows: first, we present techniques used to solve systems of polynomial equations, and in particular the technique we implemented to break TRMC. Then, we introduce the cryptosystem and compute the complexity of finding preimages of some fixed values with the resolution method we have chosen. We then present our experimental results, and discuss the security of variants of the cryptostem that would use more unknowns and/or more equations. Finally, me discuss a method that can rebuild a "pseudo-private key", a system almost as easy to invert as the private key itself.
In this section, we review some known algorithms that allow to solve a system of multivariate polynomial equations. These algorithms fall into two categories: special-purpose solving algorithms that only apply to systems having a unique solution (at least without further work), and Gröbner basis algorithms.
Since the method we used in the case of the TRMC is inspired by linear algebra solving techniques and not by Gröbner basis techniques, we will not discuss this second category of algorithms extensively. We will however make a quick review of the Buchberger algorithm, which is the historical Gröbner basis algorithm, and on more recent algorithms like F 4 and F 5 . Reference material on Gröbner basis can be found in [1] .
From now on, we will deal only with systems having a unique solution or "zero-dimensional ideals", and deal with Gröbner basis computation algorithms only in the case of such systems. Moreover, since systems of interest for us are quadratic, we will freely assume in the description of the algorithms that we deal with sets of quadratic polynomials.
Linearization, Relinearization
Linearization is the most simple and natural resolution technique. The idea behind linearization is to consider each quadratic monomial of the system as a new unknown. If the system has n variables, this introduces at most n(n + 1)/2 unknowns. Each equation is then viewed as a line vector of a matrix, with higher degree monomials leftmost. Then Gaussian elimination is applied to the system. If there are enough linearly independent equations, this will hopefully yield new polynomials without quadratic terms. Since the size of the matrix is O n 2 , the simplest reduction algorithm has a cost of O n 6 additions and multiplications in the finite field. Note that as soon as the number of linearly independent equations exceeds the total number of quadratic monomials present in the system, the gaussian elimination will yield at least one linear polynomial in the ideal, which will allow to eliminate one unknown in the original system and to iterate the method to finish the resolution.
Unfortunately, linearization requires approximately n 2 /2 equations, which is not suitable for most practical situations (there are systems with n equations or more that have a unique solution, therefore linearization leaves many systems with a unique solution unsolved).
Relinearization is a method introduced by A. Kipnis and A. Shamir to cryptanalyze HFE in [8] , and further analyzed (and compared to XL) in [11] . It is a generalization of the linearization method that works with less equations. In fact, there are several variants of the relinearization method, that are able to cope with various lower bounds for the ratio m/n 2 , where n is the number of unknowns and m the number of equations.
The simplest relinearization technique, the fourth degree relinearization, goes as follows. Build the linearized matrix as in the linearization method. This time, we have less linearly independent polynomials than quadratic monomials in the system, thus the matrix has a non-trivial kernel. Parameter the kernel space by new unknowns z 1 , . . . , z k (k = n(n+1) 2 + n + 1 − m). Now, each quadratic monomial of the original system x i x j = y ij is viewed as a linear combination of the z i . We can write quadratic equations on the z i by writing compatibility equations on the y ij : This new system will have more equations than unknowns if
This degree 4 relinearization solves the original system if the above condition is met.
Higher degree relinearizations are able to cope with systems with less equations. They consist in writing higher degree consistency equations on the z i , like for example for a degree 6 relinearization, y ij y k y pq = y ik y jp y q . Even for degree 6 relinearization, it is difficult to perfom a precise computation of the threshold m/n 2 above which systems become solvable. This is related to the fact that many consistency equations are linearly dependent, and we cannot precisely estimate the number of equations needed.
XL
XL was introduced by N. Courtois, A. Klimov, J. Patarin and A. Shamir in [11] . It relates to some works peformed by formal calculus researchers like D. Lazard (see, for example, [9] ), aimed at improving the efficiency of Gröbner basis computation by using linear algebra and Gaussian reduction.
XL is partly inspired from an idea introduced to use the Buchberger algorithm to explicitly solve systems of equations having a unique solution. The Bucherger algorithm allows to eliminate monomials in the polynomials of an ideal, that is to find new polynomials of the ideal that are written using only a specific set of monomials. Thus to solve a system, one can try to eliminate all the monomials but the powers of a selected unknown of the system, say x 1 . If this succeeds, this leads to at least one univariate polynomial in x 1 that is in the ideal. One can then use the Berlekamp algorithm to solve such a univariate polynomial equation, replace x 1 by its value in the original system, and run the algorithm again with the new system that has one unknown less than the original one.
Let S be a system of multivariate polynomial equations having a unique solution, I the ideal generated by the polynomials in S and p ∈ I. Since p is a sum of elements of S with polynomial coefficients, p is also a sum with scalar coefficients of all the multiples of elements of S by all monomials of degree ≤ d, for some degree d. This applies in particular to the univariate polynomials of the ideal (we know there are such polynomials in I since S has a unique solution).
Following the preceding observations, XL looks for univariate polynomials built from the elements of S as follows. First, a monomial order is chosen where all the powers of some unkown, say x 1 , come last. Then the matrix of all the polynomials that are multiple of some element in S by some monomial of degree d is built. The polynomials are mapped to lines in the matrix and each column gives the coefficient of the polynomials with respect to some particular monomial. Monomials that come first in the order are leftmost in the matrix. Then a Gaussian reduction is performed. If d is high enough, this step yields at least one non-zero univariate polynomial in x 1 . The algorithm then loops as described above.
Note that at this point, there is no need for a combinatorial argument about the number of polynomials built and the number of monomials of a given degree to ensure that, for some d, we will find univariate polynomials. It suffices to see that such polynomials are in the ideal and that they can be written as polynomial combinations of elements of S.
In [11] , it was proven that XL is more powerful than the relinearization algorithm, in the following sense: if a d-degree relinearization succeeds in solving a system S, then XL will also succeed by building the matrix of (total) degree d from S. Moreover, the system size of the matrix in XL will be lower than the relinearization matrix. Estimates of the complexity of XL are also given.
Gröbner bases, Buchberger, F 4 , F 5
In general, a system of polynomial equations does not have a unique solution thus "solving" it does not necessarily make sense. The relevant concept is the Gröbner basis of a polynomial system. A Gröbner basis of an ideal is a family of polynomials of the ideal that plays the same role in the multivariate case, than the polynomial generating an ideal in the univariate case. Indeed, with a Gröbner basis of an ideal I, it can be quickly decided whether a polynomial p belongs to I or not. This is done with an euclidian division algorithm generalized to the multivariate case that reduces p on the basis. The special property of Gröbner bases is that a polynomial reduces to 0 iff it belongs to the ideal. This is not true in general for a family F generating an ideal I: if a polynomial reduces to 0 on F , it belongs to the ideal (since it is a sum of elements of F ), but the converse needs not to be true.
In the case of a system having a unique solution x 1 = a 1 , . . . , x n = a n , the family X 1 − a 1 , . . . , X n − a n generates the ideal of the system and is a Gröbner basis. More generally, any (minimal) Gröbner basis of such a system will contain only degree 1 polynomials, and there will be sufficiently many of them to recover the solution of the system. Thus Gröbner basis algorithms are of interest for us.
In the univariate case, the euclidian division crucially uses the properties of the degree. The degree enables to totally order the monomials of a polynomial and then, by only considering the leading terms of two polynomials (p 1 , p 2 ), one can decide whether p 1 can be reduced by p 2 or not. In a similar fashion, in the multivariate case, we use monomial orderings (total, well-funded, compatible with multiplication). These monomial orderings are at the heart of reduction algorithms because they associate to each polynomial a leading monomial in a consistent way, and reduction decisions are made only by considering leading monomials.
-The Buchberger Algorithm
The central notion in the Buchberger algorithm is the S-polynomial S formed from a pair of polynomials (p 1 , p 2 ). S is the simplest polynomial combination of p 1 and p 2 that has a leading term strictly smaller than the least common multiple of the leading terms of p 1 and p 2 . It is formed by mutiplying p 1 and p 2 by appropriate monomials so that in the sum of the results, the two leading terms cancel each other.
A Gröbner basis has the characteristic property that all S-polynomials built upon it reduce to zero on the base; this results from the special property of Gröbner bases since S-polynomials belong to the ideal. Based on this observation, the Buchberger algorithm works as follows: starting from a polynomial family F , one builds all the S-polynomials that can be formed from F , then reduces them on F . If all polynomials reduce to zero, F is a Gröbner basis.
If not, non-zero polynomials that have been found after reduction are added to F . This yields new pairs to examine. This algorithm always terminates, but the execution time and the size of the resulting basis are hard to predict; in particular, the resulting family is not in general a minimal Gröbner basis. It usually contains many redundant polynomials and can be "cleaned up".
One of the problems of the Buchberger algorithm is that once it has built a Gröbner basis of an ideal, there are usually many pairs left to examine and the algorithm will terminate only when all these pairs have been reduced to zero. This termination phase usually represents a significant part of the computation. It is possible to avoid reducing some pairs, but we will see that in F 5 or in linear algebraic approaches, an efficient criterion can be found to avoid considering polynomials trivially reducing to zero.
-F 4 and F 5 Both of these algorithms were engineered by J.C. Faugère and his team. F 4 was introduced in [5] and F 5 in [3] . F 4 uses some ideas from the Buchberger algorithm combined with linear algebra. Its performance is roughly equivalent to XL for a system that has a unique solution.
F 5 is built upon F 4 but has the additional property to avoid trivial reductions to zero. This is performed by maintaining a set of known generators G of the ideal, and avoiding to form polynomial relations gh − hg = 0 (g, h ∈ G). Other trivial relations may also arise from the Frobenius map of the finite field, but F 5 avoids considering them too.
A Variant of XL: the Linear Method
In this section, we describe the variant of XL that we implemented. We call it the Linear Method. Just like XL tries to build univariate polynomials, our method looks for linear polynomials in the ideal. Once sufficiently many (linearly independent) linear polynomials have been built, the solution of the system can be found. This purely linear approach has provable properties that will be very useful to break TRMC, even if XL might be more efficient.
Principles of the Linear Method
Let S be a set of polynomials and I =< S > the ideal it generates. The basic operation of the algorithm, for a target degree d, unfolds as follows. Consider The matrix can then be row reduced by the Gauss algorithm. Since this reduction cancels the coefficients of the higher degree monomials in the polynomials described by the matrix, it may yield new polynomials of degree < d. In general, it is difficult to find an optimal strategy. Moreover, the behavior of the algorithm is heavily dependent on the structure of the system solved. For random systems, the choice of strategy is usually not so important, because no fall of degree will happen before the critical degree for which the corresponding matrix has mores lines than columns.
We specialized our algorithm to solve TRMC, and since we wanted to explore in detail the combinatorial behavior of the system, we did not implement any particular stategy and rather opted for a manual sequencing.
-Numerical data for TRMC
With 40 variables such as in the case of the TRMC, and 48 polynomials in S, the degree 4 matrix is 39360 × 123410. It is only feasible to go to degree 4 or 5 on a typical 32-bit machine, e.g. a PC with 2 GB of RAM.
-An alternative to the Gauss reduction: sparse matrix algebra
Let A be the the degree d matrix before Gauss reduction. • Starting with degree 4, if the polynomials of the system have degree 2, the matrices that are built yield many polynomials trivially reducing to zero arising from the relations f g − gf = 0 (see section 5.1 for an example). This can be avoided by selectively removing some polynomial multiples when building the matrix.
• When a linear polynomial has been found, it can be used to reduce the number of unknowns in the system by a direct susbstitution, instead of adding multiples of to the known polynomials. The same polynomials are found in both cases, but the first approach is faster and saves memory. In the case of TRMC however, these optimizations are not relevant since they would save very little computation time.
Properties of the Linear Method
Here, we present two key properties of the Linear Method which enable it to break TRMC. The proofs are given in annex A.
In the course of the resolution of a system, we are interested in the number of linearly independent polynomials of degree d < d that appear when reducing the degree d matrix. These falls of degree are strongly related to the ability to solve a system. The number of falls of degree that appear at all degrees d and for all sequencing choices of the algorithm when solving a system S are what we call the combinatorial properties of S.
Independence from Linear-Affine Masking Two systems equal up to left linear and right affine invertible transformations have the same combinatorial properties w.r.t. the linear method.
Independence from Subfield Projection If the Linear Method is able to solve a system S expressed on a finite extension G of a field F by reducing degrees less than d, it will also be able to solve S expressed on F by reducing degrees less than d.
In the case of TRMC, these properties mean that the public key and private key systems have the same combinatorial properties. In particular, the Linear Method will give the same results on both systems.
The Tractable Rational Map Cryptosystem
The Tractable Rational Map Cryptosystem was introduced in [2] by F. Chang and L. Wang. Its private key is a system of 48 quadratic equations with 40 unknowns over F = GF (2 8 ). In the public key, these equations are masked by affine transformations on the left (before the polynomial system) and on the right (after the polynomial system). Some equations of the private key are derived from extensions of F , GF (2 16 ), GF (2 32 ) and GF (2 128 ). As in [2] , we will use the notation x i,...,i+k−1 for a k-uple of elements x i , . . . , x i+k−1 of GF ( 2 8 ) viewed as an element of the extension GF (2 8k ) of GF ( 2 8 ). The input of the private system is x 1 , . . . , x 40 , and its output is y 1 , . . . , y 48 . The system can be written as follows : 2 , x 3,4 , x 5,6 , x 7,8 , x 9,10 , x 11,12 , x 13,14 ) ( 1 ) 
where:
-a, b and c are random values in GF (2 8 ),
-f 1 , . . . , f 6 are random quadratic polynomials over GF (2 8 ) (the number of variables of each polynomial ranges from 18 to 23), -f 7,...,22 is a random system of 16 quadratic polynomials over GF (2 8 ) with 24 variables, -q 1 , . . . , q 11 are random quadratic polynomials with 7 variables over GF (2 16 ).
Note that in any extension of F = GF (2 8 ), viewed as a F -vector space, x → x 256 is linear, and each multiplication coordinate is a quadratic form. Therefore all equations, including equations 12 and 19, yield quadratic equations when expressed over F .
As far as our attack is concerned, we will only retain the following aspects of the structure of the system: it has a block triangular structure; it contains a random susbsystem of 11 equations with 7 variables over GF (2 16 ), that must be solved first. The next equations allow to retrieve one or several variables at a time (depending on the field on which they are written).
Combinatorial Properties of the Public and Private
Key of TRMC By section 3.2, we know that the combinatorial properties of the public and private key of TRMC are the same. That means that the Linear Method is able to break TRMC without exploring a higher degree than the one needed to solve the private key system expressed over GF (2 8 ). In this section, we show that the private key system can be solved by analyzing degrees ≤ 4.
We first review the behavior of the Linear Method on the subsystem of 11 equations with 7 variables over GF (2 16 ). We do not have to consider the role of field equations (x |k| − x = 0) since the maximum degree of the polynomials we will consider, 4, is less than the size of the smallest field considered, GF (2 8 ). We also need the number of polynomials of a given degree d that can be formed from the 11 original polynomials: degree 2 3 4 polynomials 11 77 308
Resolution of the Subsystem Over
Suppose now we try to build linear polynomials by multiplying the original polynomials by quadratic polynomials. Will we find some? This is equivalent to saying that we are looking for linear combinations of the 11+77+308=396 polynomials of the preceding table, that are linear. We thus need to cancel 210+84+28=322 terms in these polynomials. Unfortunately, our 396 polynomials are not linearly independent, because there are 11 2 = 55 relations in degree 4 of the form f g − gh = 0 with g = h belonging to the set of the original polynomials. This leaves us with 396-55-322=19 linear polynomials. They cannot be linearly independent. Indeed, since we only have 7 variables and since our system has a unique solution, the dimension of the linear polynomials in the system is 7. Thus we have 12 more cancellations, which are in fact caused by the redundancy of the original equations (with very high probability, not all of the equations of the original system are needed for the system to have a unique solution).
We know by section 3.2 that when translated over GF (2 8 ), the subsystem, which becomes a system of 22 equations with 14 variables, is still solvable by exploring degrees 4, 3, 2 then 1.
These theoretical observations are confirmed when running our algorithm on such a system. Building and reducing the matrices of degrees 4, then 3, 2 and 1 of the system expressed over GF (2 16 ) yields the solution as expected. The total number of cancellations occuring during the computation is 67, which corresponds to the 55 "f g − gh" cancellations and the 12 redundancy cancellations. Over GF (2 8 ), the system can be solved as well, but the number of cancellations observed (255) is higher than 2 × 67, because many parasistic redundant equations are induced by the projections.
Behavior of the Linear Method over the Full Private Key
Because of the results of section 5.1, when reducing degrees 4, 3, 2, then 1, we expect to find 14 linearly independent linear polynomials in the ideal. Then, by adding multiples of these polynomials to the degree 2 matrix (which amounts to using these relations to reduce the number of variables in the original system), and reducing degree 2 again, we expect to find 4 more linear polynomials (because once x 1 , . . . , x 14 
Linear Method used Over Instances of TRMC Public Keys
To be in a realistic cryptanalysis situation, we built a random public key with Magma [10], computed the image of a random vector by the public key, and built the system composed of the value obtained substracted to the key. We then tried to solve the resulting system using the Linear Method 3 . The resolution process follows exactly the steps described in subsection 5.2: reduction of degrees 4 downto 1 yields 14 linear polynomials, and then we only have to loop between degrees 1 and 2 to get 4, then 1, 1, 1, 1, 15, 2 and 1 linear equations. The longest step is the degree 4 reduction, which we have performed using a lanczos algorithm. The computation time of the lanczos algorithm is proportional to the number of vectors computed. Thus, instead of looking for degree 3 polynomials in the degree 4 matrix M , we tried to build directly quadratic polynomials: this gave us 23 polynomials instead of the 273 cubic polynomials that can be buit from M (these are experimental figures obtained from experiments on a system of 11 equations with 7 variables on GF (2 16 ) and expressed over GF (2 8 )). Overall, the lanczos resolution took 5 hours on a cluster of 6 bi-pentium IV PCs and used 400MB of RAM on each machine (data was duplicated on every machine). In that case, a Gauss reduction would have probably been faster but broke the 2GB per process limit, and could not be implemented simply on a 32-bit PC.
The other steps are performed in a few minutes on an average PC.
Asymptotic Security of TRMC
Here, we estimate the computation time ratio between the legitimate user of the system and the cryptanalyst who tries to decrypt a message, first for the "plain" TRMC algorithm, and then in the asymtptotic limit of a generalized TRMC with more variables and equations. The preimage computation method suggested by the authors of TRMC is to solve first the random subsystem using XL, and then to substitute the result into the other equations. Using the Linear Method instead of XL, solving the random subsystem S requires to build the degree 4 matrix from the 11 equations with 7 variables of S. The complexity of a legitimate inversion is thus roughly equal to the computation of the kernel of a 11 * = 210 matrix. On the other hand, the cryptanalyst must deal with 48 equations with 40 unknowns, and thus compute the kernel of a matrix of size 39360 × 123410. Suppose this computation is performed using a Gauss reduction, and that the cost of a reduction of a a × b matrix is a 2 b, then the complexity ratio between the cryptanalyst and the legitimate user is about 2 23 .
